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"Safe Streets, Inc.: The 'Hustle' to End Black Gang Violence in Philadelphia, 1969-1976" 
Abstract: 
From 1962 to 1968, gang stabbings and murders in Philadelphia drastically increased, inspiring 
Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen Specter (from 1965-1973) to establish Safe Streets, Inc. in 
August 1969 as a non-profit, anti-gang program designed to reduce gang violence, end turf wars 
between rival gangs, and provide social services like job training and academic tutoring to 
juveniles. Since the program came into existence amidst the Civil Rights Movement (1954-
1968), numerous cases of police brutality, and over 200 race riots in post-industrial cities, the 
yearly Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) grant from the federal government 
offered to cities under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 became 
appealing to liberal and conservative politicians alike. Many conservative city officials often 
conflated civil rights protestors, rioters, social activists, and gang members into a single entity 
that was a constant nuisance to the police. Additionally, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
proposition of the Great Society programs, War on Poverty and War on Crime, led liberals and 
conservatives to debate on how to reduce crime with the LEAA grant. Conservatives argued 
police departments should receive the LEAA grant to spend on strengthening its crime-fighting 
methods. Conversely, liberals lobbied for the funds to finance local social uplift programs that 
would gradually rectify the issue of urban poverty and effectively reduce crime. Although the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965, and 1968 federally enforced desegregation and equal 
opportunity employment, voting, and housing respectively, several conservative politicians like 
Mayor Frank L. Rizzo (from 1972-1980) refused to believed that curing the social ills of poverty, 
unemployment, and school dropouts would result in massive crime reduction in major cities like 
Philadelphia. From 1969 to 1976, Specter competed with Mayor Frank Rizzo for funding to 
rehabilitate youth at Safe Streets’ centers in the predominantly black neighborhoods of North and 
West Philadelphia while Rizzo proposed to utilize the grant to strengthen crime-fighting 
techniques within the police department. Nevertheless, the battle over federal funding between 
liberal and conservative politicians influenced police-community relations in the 1970s when 
violence between police and citizens in Philadelphia was at its highest in forty years. 
Word Count: 348 words 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Introduction 
      On the warm Friday afternoon of August 10, 2018, I made a trek to the neighborhood of 
Sharswood looking for 2201 W. Stewart Street, the location of one of the 1970s Safe Streets, Inc. 
centers promoting anti-gang activity, as a research tactic that my cultured colleagues at Temple 
refer to as “flâneuring.”1 By going to the site of the former facility, I hoped to gain a geographic 
and emotional understanding of the neighborhood where this anti-gang program existed. I 
wanted to not only be connected to the research, but also acquire insight into how this program 
functioned in this neighborhood when it was active. More importantly, I wanted to know if Safe 
Streets left a lasting impact on the neighborhood after it shuttered its doors.  
      The next day, I felt ambitious and explored the Cobbs Creek neighborhood surrounding 249 
S. 60th Street, the location of the second Safe Streets center. I went to these locations alone, on 
foot, in the heat and rain, and unknowingly through gang territory. At these locations in North 
and West Philadelphia respectively, I found desolation, poverty, boarded up buildings, and 
housing projects, but also well-kept homes, murals, revitalization projects under construction, 
and major landmarks—remnants of the demolished and infamous Blumberg Housing Projects, 
the Moderne-Art Deco styled Vaux High School, and the Free Library dedicated to 1960s civil 
rights activist Cecil B. Moore. However, my overall impression and feeling while being in these 
neighborhoods was one of isolation, abandonment, fear, angst, and vulnerability.     
      When I started working on this project, I was investigating how politicians, community 
residents, and police officers attempted to solve tensions between police and the black 
community with social programs in 1970s Philadelphia. From 1970-1978, there were 469 police-
                                               
1 Lauren Elkin, Flâneuse: Women Walk the City in Paris, New York, Tokyo, Venice, and London, New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2017. 
4 
involved shootings in which 66% of all suspects shot were black, even though African 
Americans comprised 33% of Philadelphia’s population.2 In the 1970s, seventeen officers died 
by gunfire, assault, and stabbing. Philadelphia had not experienced such a deadly decade for 
police since the 1920s when 27 officers were murdered at the hands of criminal suspects.3 In 
several of these 1970s police homicide cases, African American suspects killed white police 
officers as a response to black citizen-white police confrontations they believed to be police 
brutality. 
      In my efforts to investigate how Philadelphians sought to solve this issue of violence between 
young black male citizens and police officers, I discovered the program Safe Streets, that 
Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen Specter (from 1965-1973) founded in Delaware in Spring 
1969 as a nonprofit organization designed to “encourage gangs into constructive programs.”4 
However, as I researched Safe Streets at Temple University’s Special Collections Archives, I 
kept asking myself, how this anti-gang program is related to the issue of racial tension and 
violence between police and black citizens? The answer to this question turned out to be more 
complicated than I imagined it would be. 
     Gangs have existed in Philadelphia as early as 1836.5 In the nineteenth century, citizens 
living, working, or travelling through gang territory often faced the possibility of experiencing 
                                               
2 Anthony E. Jackson, Esq., “Statement of Anthony E. Jackson, Esq., Director, Police Project, PILCOP, April 19, 
1979,” April 19, 1979, PILCOP.org, accessed May 7, 2015, 
www.pilcop.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/04/Deadly_Force_1.pdf. See the Appendix for statistics on the white and 
black populations in Philadelphia from 1900 to 1980. 
3 “Fallen Officers-Philadelphia Police Department, 1828-2015,” Officer Down Memorial Page, accessed, May 8, 
2015, www.odmp.org. 
4 “U.S. gives DA $80,000 for Gang Control,” Philadelphia Evening Bulletin (June 26, 1969), Temple University 
Special Collections Research Center, Philadelphia Evening Bulletin clippings, box. 3354, call no. SCRC 169-B, vol. 
Safe Streets, Inc., collection URB. 
5 Eric C. Schneider, “Crime,” The Encyclopedia of Greater Philadelphia, (2014), accessed November 17, 2018, 
https://philadelphiaencyclopedia.org/archive/crime/. 
5 
street crime that consisted of pickpocketing, armed robberies, “smash-and-grab robberies in local 
stores and marketplaces,” pocket watch stealing, or getting caught in the middle of a “bloody 
rumble” between rival gangs.6 In gang-active communities, these organizations survived 
economically through the operation of illegal activities such as alcohol and drug sales, gambling, 
racketeering, and prostitution.7 For individuals who willingly joined these organizations, gangs 
provided a sense of belonging, protection from neighborhood outsiders and police, and income to 
members, especially during periods of economic downturns in American society.8 
      Street gangs like the Schuylkill Rangers (active for 25 years in the mid-1800s), motorcycle 
gangs like the Ramblers, organized crime syndicates like Philadelphia’s Italian Mafia and the 
like have all functioned in marginalized and disadvantaged communities, often because of 
societal stigmas based on ethnicity, class, or immigration status.9 From the nineteenth to early 
twentieth century, gangs were most notably present and policed in working-class, Irish, African 
American, and immigrant communities in Philadelphia. These were the same groups that often 
faced housing discrimination where the only affordable homes available to them were located in 
“undesirable” locations near dockyards, rivers, and swampland. Joblessness, meager 
employment opportunities (e.g., domestic, bricklayer, or railroad builder), and segregated and 
underprivileged schools and public facilities kept many individuals from these communities in 
poverty for generations.10 Interestingly, several gangs in the nineteenth century provided some 
                                               
6 Kali Gross, Colored Amazons: Crime, Violence, and Black Women in the City of Brotherly Love, 1880-1910, 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 
7 Karl E. Johnson, “Police-Black Community Relations in Postwar Philadelphia: Race and Criminalization in Urban 
Social Spaces, 1945-1960,” The Journal of African American History, 89. 2, African Americans and the Urban 
Landscape (Spring, 2004):118-134.  
8 Phineas M. Anderson, The Gang Unit, Washington, D.C.: ERIC Clearinghouse, 1970. 
9 “Crime.” 
10 John F. Bauman, “Black Slums/Black Projects: The New Deal and Negro Housing in Philadelphia,” Pennsylvania 
History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 41.3, (July 1974): 310-338. 
6 
beneficence to their communities, such as assisting volunteer fire companies in gaining access to 
water supplies and forcefully encouraging residents to vote in elections. In the twentieth century, 
North Philadelphia youth gangs active between 1963 and 1965 stood alongside church women’s 
groups, black-led trade unions, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) to protest segregation at the private all-white high school, Girard College.11 
However, their criminal activities overshadowed their good deeds and encouraged police and the 
city to map out their locations of operation, raid their hangouts, and arrest and imprison them in 
facilities like Eastern State Penitentiary for breaking the law.12  
      By 1947, Philadelphia police officers, under the initiative of Sergeant August “Gus” 
Rangnow (1892-1972), established the Police Athletic League (PAL) following World War II to 
deter youth of underprivileged communities from engaging in street crime and drug use.13 By the 
1960s, there were nineteen PAL centers throughout the city offering free after-school programs 
for tens of thousands of children from ages six to eighteen. The main goal of PAL centers was to 
connect police officers with neighborhood children via mentorship, friendship, and 
sportsmanship in athletic games of boxing, baseball, basketball, table tennis, and marching 
band.14 As police commissioner (from 1968-1972), Frank L. Rizzo visited prisons and 
participated in multiple PAL events like “Commissioner for a Day” in which he gave teenagers 
assignments at police headquarters.15 As mayor (from 1972-1980), Rizzo continued his selective 
                                               
11 Matthew J. Countryman, Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
12 “Crime.” 
13 Matthew Ward, “Police Athletic League,” The Encyclopedia of Greater Philadelphia, (2017), 
Philadelphiaencyclopedia.org, accessed May 3, 2018, http://philadelphiaencyclopedia.org/archive/police-athletic-
league/. 
14 PAL centers also offered children arts and crafts, homework clubs, and literacy programs. 
15 “Sniper shoots down police, setting off a massive manhunt,” The Philadelphia Inquirer (Feb 26, 1976): 2-A, 
Newspapers.com, accessed March 31, 2017, https://www.newspapers.com/clip/9053474/the_philadelphia_inquirer/. 
7 
involvement in crime prevention by not only signing autographs for children and assisting police 
at crime scenes, but also promoting American patriotism at PAL centers. Officers, coaches, and 
mentors (assigned by Rizzo) at PAL centers encouraged children to say the pledge of allegiance 
and sign oaths of allegiance that were sent to Mayor Rizzo and other state and national 
politicians.16 Furthermore, PAL centers not only used recreation to steer children from crime, but 
also indoctrinate them into being loyal citizens. 
      As gang activity and violence persisted into the late twentieth century, racial tension between 
white police and the black community coexisted along with it as early as the late 1800s. 
Following the First and Second Great Migrations of 6.6 million African Americans (from 1916 
to 1970) from Southern states to Northern industrial cities like Philadelphia, 1940s racial tension 
between white police and black citizens originated in integrating neighborhoods where unpoliced 
white racism and violence provoked racial conflict between average whites and blacks.17 In the 
1950s, job flight and white flight to the suburbs left communities economically and racially 
imbalanced, which inevitably frayed positive relationships forged in schools, residential 
neighborhoods, and the workplace.18 In the 1960s, when the United States witnessed peaceful 
protests as the Civil Rights Movement was undertaken through social and legal channels, there 
were numerous incidents of police brutality against African American peaceful protestors and 
criminal suspects that sparked a nationwide outbreak of over 200 race riots in several major U.S. 
cities.19 Locally, the 1964 Columbia Avenue Riots in North Philadelphia--stirred by the false 
                                               
16 “Police Athletic League.” 
17 Stephen Grant Meyer, As Long as They Don’t Move Next Door: Segregation and Racial Conflict in American 
Neighborhoods, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. 
18 James Wolfinger, Philadelphia Divided: Race and Politics in the City of Brotherly Love, Chapel Hill; University 
of North Carolina Press, 2007. 
19 Thomas Ferrick Jr., Doreen Carvajal, and Thomas J. Gibbons Jr., “The 25-year-old Scars Of A Riot Violence Of 
1964 Devastated A Vital Neighborhood,” Philadelphia Inquirer, (Aug. 27, 1989), Articles. Philly.com, accessed 
May 8, 2015, http://articles.philly.com/1989-08-27/news/26150452_1_riot-wells-notices-slides. 
8 
rumor that a white policeman beat a pregnant black woman to death--indefinitely etched racial 
tension between black citizens and police. During the two-day riot, approximately 1,800 officers 
were called to stop the uprising after African American residents burned cars, destroyed and 
looted more than two hundred white businesses, and fought with police.20   
      Amidst this period of social unrest, many conservative city officials often conflated civil 
rights protestors, rioters, social activists, and gang members into a single entity that was a 
constant nuisance to the police. Police soon became militarized and schools, housing projects, 
streets, and mass transportation inhabited by African Americans became criminalized.21 
Additionally, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s proposition of the Great Society programs, War on 
Poverty and War on Crime, led liberals and conservatives to debate how to reduce crime with the 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) grant the federal government offered to 
cities under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. In the first fiscal year of 
the LEAA, the federal agency received $59 million from the national budget. In 1970, the 
LEAA’s budget was raised to $268 million and by July 1st, President Richard M. Nixon 
requested that U.S. Congress allot $480 million for the agency.22  
      Each year, the LEAA offered grants to states desiring to curb crime through policing and or 
social programs. Each state dispensed funds to localities following an application and evaluation 
process. During the fiscal year of 1970, LEAA granted California $17.3 million, New York 
received $16.4 million, and Pennsylvania got $11.5 million to implement anti-crime planning 
                                               
20 Countryman, Up South, 154-164. 
21 Heather Ann Thompson, “Why Mass Incarceration Matters,” Journal of American History, 2010. 
22 William J. Speer, “The Safe Streets project—Inroads on Phila. Gang Control?,” Philadelphia Inquirer (Feb. 22 
1970), Temple University Special Collections Research Center, Philadelphia Evening Bulletin clippings, box. 3354, 
call no. SCRC 169-B, vol. Safe Streets, Inc., collection URB. 
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and social programs.23 Conservatives argued police departments should receive the LEAA grant 
to spend on strengthening its crime-fighting methods. Conversely, liberals lobbied for the funds 
to finance local social uplift programs that would gradually rectify the issue of urban poverty and 
effectively reduce crime.24 Although the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965, and 1968 federally 
enforced desegregation and equal opportunity employment, voting, and housing respectively, 
several conservative politicians like Mayor Frank L. Rizzo refused to believed that curing the 
social ills of poverty, unemployment, school dropouts, and gang violence would result in 
massive crime reduction in major cities like Philadelphia.  
The Formation of Safe Streets, Inc. 
      In the late 1960s, gang violence gradually became a serious issue in Philadelphia. From 1962 
to 1968, gang-related homicides per year jumped from one to thirty.25 In 1969 alone, there were 
45 gang-related murders, 267 gang-related injuries, and numerous incidents of “burglary and 
purse snatching” that affected gang members and innocent bystanders, including children.26 In 
July 1969, the Pennsylvania Crime Commission released their report on gang violence in 
Philadelphia stating there were currently 75 active, sporadic, or dormant gangs (each comprised 
of black, white, or Puerto Rican members), 3,000 gang members known by police, and each gang 
consisted of 25-250 members ranging from ages 12 to 23 years old. About 84% of gang 
members were aged sixteen or older.27 In that same year, the Philadelphia Police Department’s 
                                               
23 “The Safe Streets project—Inroads on Phila. Gang Control?” 
24 Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016.  
25 “Philadelphia Gangs: Gang-related Homicides in Philadelphia 1965-1976,” Philadelphia Evening Bulletin (May 23, 
1976), Temple University Special Collections Research Center, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Collection, call no. SCRC 170, vol. Gangs--Miscellaneous, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
Photographs, P254Z201411000174B. 
26 Anderson, The Gang Unit, 2. 
27 Ibid, 17-18. 
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Gang Control Unit reported that approximately 20% of the individuals shot, stabbed, or beaten as 
a result of gang violence were civilians unaffiliated with a gang.28  
      Similar to previous generations, gang participation among youth and young adults occurred 
because they sought a place where they belonged, protection from neighborhood rivals and 
police, and income to improve their impoverished lifestyles. Depending on the gang, boys and 
young men were inducted into the organization if they voiced their desire to be a member, 
proved their potential by stealing a designated item, or fought one or more gang members. In a 
May 1969 interview with a reporter from the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, one gang member 
described his induction process as: “You have to fight about ten guys to join. You don't have to 
beat them all up, but you must show that you can defend yourself and that you have guts."29 In 
other cases, the initiation process was simpler if the individual was related to a current gang 
member or possessed a gun. It was a rare occurrence for individuals to be “drafted” or forced to 
join a gang against their will. According to Police Sergeant Joseph E. Rich, supervisor of the 
Gang Control Unit, the only time youth were coerced to join was when a gang was lacking 
“troops” in the middle of  “warfare” with a rival: "The only time a kid is drafted into a gang is 
when the gang is over-extended militarily--that is, fighting two or three fights at once. The 
‘runners’ [leaders of the gang] are pretty smart; they know that draftees don't make such good 
fighters."30  
      Once in the gang, members were organized into different levels: the “Old Heads” (members 
aged 18-23), the "Young Boys" (sometimes broken into two sub-levels, "Juniors" and "Seniors,” 
but are between the ages of 14-17), the "Midgets" (ages 12-14 years old), and recruits in waiting 
                                               
28 Ibid, 20.  
29 Ibid, 20-25. 
30 Ibid. 
11 
known as "Pygmies" or "Swiggetts" (aged 12 years old and younger).31 Among the “Old Heads,” 
the “runner” or “warlord” was the leader of the gang. Some gangs had  a “runner” who held total 
responsibility for the gang and a “warlord” who was in charge of “military” affairs. The “second 
runner” was next in command when the “runner” was not present. Lastly, the “checkholder” was 
responsible for overseeing the lowest rank of gang members, the “corner boys,” and reporting the 
activity of those “troops” to the “runners.”32  
      The names gang members selected to identify their groups were based on the neighborhood 
of their headquarters or defined by one or more of their group’s personal characteristics. For 
example, the 8th and Diamond Streeters referred to the intersection where they lived and 
occupied, Zulu Nation reflected the gang’s racial pride in being black, and the Moon Gang 
signified how gang members were “active” when the moon appeared at night. In times of 
“warfare” or “protection,” gangs carried a multitude of weapons: rods, shotguns, pistols, zip guns 
(a makeshift “gun” made of pipe, a block of wood, rubber bands, friction tape, and a door latch), 
switch blades, razors, car aerials, chains, pipes, and leather straps.33 Guns acquired for a gang 
were often illegally purchased in their neighborhood or legally purchased by gang members 
eighteen years old or older. In Philadelphia, there were no well-established gangs comprised of 
girls and young women. However, the girlfriends of gang members at times participated in gang 
activities such as spying on rivals, carrying weapons, or fighting a girl affiliated with another 
gang.34 
                                               
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
12 
      As gang violence increased, politicians began to publicly voice their concerns, namely Mayor 
James H.J. Tate (from 1962-1972) who was quoted in 1969 by the New York Times saying, 
“gang violence is giving Philadelphia a bad name.”35 Ironically, in the year prior to Tate’s press 
statement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that out of ten major cities in the 
nation, Philadelphia had the lowest rates in major crimes such as rapes, aggravated assaults, 
larcenies, and car theft. To Philadelphians aware of gang violence in the city, speculation arose 
as to where and how the FBI got their data to make such claims. In 1968, critics suspected the 
crime data was flawed because it ignored the anti-crime work of community activists and the fact 
that Police Commissioner Rizzo’s “tough on crime” approach may have been the reason for 
crime reduction in certain situations.36  
      Since the 1950s, the Philadelphia Police Department came under scrutiny for numerous 
charges of police brutality when the department pursued a “pro crime fighter” stance that 
consisted of less emphasis on “emergency services and maintaining order” and more focus on 
“serious crimes” like rape, murder, robbery, and burglary. As a result, police officers carried out 
this order by “relying on motorized patrol, rapidly responding to calls for services, and using 
forensic science to investigate crimes.”37 This focus on “serious crimes” often resulted in 
excessive force because forcible felonies permitted police to invoke legal deadly force against a 
suspect when an individual’s life was threatened.38 Additionally, discriminatory policing led to 
the overrepresentation of African Americans in prisons and their underrepresentation in law 
                                               
35 Donald Janson, “Gangs Face Drive in Philadelphia” New York Times, (Feb. 13, 1972), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1972/02/13/archives/gangs-face-drive-in-philadelphia-police-open-crackdown-on-
youths.html. 
36 Timothy Lombardo, Blue-Collar Conservatism: Frank Rizzo's Philadelphia and Populist Politics, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018. 
37 Police Study Task Force, Philadelphia and Its Police: Toward a New Partnership, A Report by the Police Study 
Task Force, Philadelphia: Philadelphia Task Force, 1986. 
38 According to Pennsylvania law, a forcible felony crime is rape, murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping.  
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enforcement. On January 10, 1950, the Philadelphia Tribune published an article stating that 
40% of the city’s prison population was African American, even though black people were only 
18% of Philadelphia’s population.39 
      Under Police Commissioner Howard Leary (1962–1965), he sought to improve police-
community relations through organizations like the Police Advisory Board (PAB) as an effort to 
reduce crime. When the 1964 Columbia Avenue Riots occurred under his watch, he ordered 
police officers (including Deputy Commissioner Rizzo) to stand down and not pursue rioters and 
looters.40 Instead, Leary permitted local church, civil rights, and community leaders to meet with 
residents and arrange forums where police and citizens could discuss the racially-charged issues 
that sparked the riot.41 
      In the late 1960s, Rizzo rose to the rank of police commissioner by implementing 
discriminatory policing tactics that involved excessive force and civil rights violations against 
“objectionable people” who did not fit the mold of what a true patriotic (white) law-abiding 
citizen was: nonwhite, poor, homosexual, hippie, liberal, or political dissident.42 To Rizzo, these 
“objectionable people” were the catalysts for immorality, street crime, and blight in Philadelphia. 
As an Italian (seeking white solidarity in an ethnically-biased political sphere), conservative, 
anti-crime advocate, Rizzo aligned himself with the city’s growing “law and order” constituency 
and remained tough on crime. Furthermore, it was common for activists like Spencer Coxe, the 
Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) Philadelphia Branch, to 
receive numerous complaints of Police Captain Rizzo ordering the illegal raids of coffee houses, 
                                               
39 Ibid, 122. 
40 Lombardo, Blue-Collar Conservatism, 140-141. 
41 Countryman, Up South, 163-164. 
42 Amateur Night at City Hall: The Story of Frank L. Rizzo, Dir. Robert Mugge, MVD Entertainment Group, 1978, 
Kanopy, Web, accessed November 24, 2017. 
14 
public squares, and political offices to disperse “undesirable” people who would offend his “law 
and order” constituency.43 
      When Rizzo became police commissioner in April 1967, he not only installed the strict 
policies of  “stop and frisk” and emergency curfews, but also attempted to bolster the police 
department by purchasing armored personnel transports that his critics likened to “military 
tanks.” Additionally, Rizzo was not a supporter of the PAB, thought police brutality was rare and 
required no departmental investigation of misconduct (despite many complaints from civil rights 
organizations), and if there was a riot it was to be “treated with a firm hand.”44 Nevertheless, as 
handgun purchases (legal and illegal) and juvenile crime rose nationally, Philadelphia’s city 
officials soon became preoccupied with the rapid increase in gang violence and sought to take 
action in 1969. 
      In 1968, the Pennsylvania Crime Commission reported there were approximately 14,000 
juvenile arrests and 83,000 gang members in Philadelphia with “core” gang members being 
repeat offenders of violent crime.45  In Summer 1968, a series of incidents in North Philadelphia 
encouraged community residents and politicians to invest in a program to end gang violence. 
After new spread that a boy was shot and killed in a gang fight and gang rivals, Zulu Nation and 
the 8th and Diamond Streeters had declared war, Yorktown residents sent a message to the 
District Attorney’s Office asking for help. On Independence Day, residents and staff from the 
DA’s Office met with leaders of both gangs on a North Philadelphia street corner to end the 
                                               
43 Amateur Night at City Hall. 
44 Lombardo, Blue-Collar Conservatism, 140-141.  
45 Anderson, The Gang Unit, 19. 
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violence. Following this series of incidents, politicians became more interested in finding a 
remedial solution outside of policing to address gang activity in the city.46  
      Taking into consideration the statistics on gang violence, advice from Family Court Judge 
Paul A. Dandridge, and community pleas for solutions, Philadelphia DA Arlen Specter contacted 
President Richard M. Nixon to propose his project, Safe Streets, Inc. President Nixon responded 
with the suggestion that Specter apply for an LEAA grant to fund the non-profit organization. 
Specter applied for an LEAA grant in May 1968 to fund the pilot, anti-gang program designed to 
lower the rate of teenage gang homicides and “encourage gangs into constructive programs.”47 
In the LEAA application, Specter stated “gang violence has reached proportions which threaten 
the entire law enforcement process of the community,” to highlight the urgency of a program that 
would curb gang violence and juvenile delinquency in the city. Among the proposed activities 
Specter pitched was four-day retreats at hostels or in rural settings where gang members could 
gain free counseling from group therapists, an idea inspired by the New York City drug addiction 
treatment organization, Daytop Village founded in 1963 by psychiatrist Daniel Casriel and 
Roman Catholic priest Monsignor William B. O’Brien.48  
      In Spring 1969, Specter formally established the organization to lower juvenile delinquency 
and crime, while also ensuring there was proper procedural action in criminal cases. By June 
1969, Safe Streets received a $80,267 LEAA grant for youth gang control in North Central and 
West Philadelphia.49 The LEAA program granted $215 million to state and local governments to 
improve police forces, the courts, and correction systems. One of the conditions for LEAA-
                                               
46 “The Safe Streets project—Inroads on Phila. Gang Control?” 
47 “The Safe Streets project—Inroads on Phila. Gang Control?” 
48 “The Safe Streets project—Inroads on Phila. Gang Control?” 
49 “U.S. gives DA $80,000 for Gang Control.” 
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approved organizations was state and local agencies had to fund between 40-50% of the 
organization’s budget. If an LEAA-approved organization did not meet local and state standards, 
those agencies could deny it funding. The Pennsylvania Crime Commission disbursed 
discretionary funding to Safe Streets approximately every six months. As a federally-approved 
organization, Safe Streets received a list of priorities from the local government, but its LEAA 
grant status could not be revoked by local or state agencies when it did not meet its goals. In 
1969, approximately 75% of Safe Streets’ funding came from the LEAA grant, while the 
remaining 25% ($25,000) came from a grant given by affiliates of the Greater Philadelphia 
Movement.50 
      In August 1969, Safe Streets was in operation with a mixture of politicians, police officers, 
and community activists from the neighborhood surrounding the two centers. At each center, 
there was a unit director who planned and supervised activities, an assistant director who worked 
directly with gangs on the street, eight youth workers who worked with gang members, two 
teachers for tutoring, and a community organizer who facilitated parental and community 
support for the center’s activities.51 In 1969, the organization’s board consisted of: Specter as the 
program chairman; Police Detective Heywood Matthews as executive director; Clarence Fowler 
as unit director of the North Philadelphia center; Assistant District Attorney Walter W. Cohen as 
the project administrator of federal funds; and Assistants Dave Johnson and Bernard Rhodes. 
The staff at Safe Streets were often men like Bennie Swans, a former gang member turned 
community activist, who were paid to facilitate recreational and community service activities 
with youth in and or vulnerable to gang activity near its two locations.52    
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      From its inception, the mission of Safe Streets was to be a “one-stop juvenile center” where 
police officers, former gang members, and community activists worked together to teach at-risk 
teenagers “responsibility and concern for themselves and society.”53 North and West 
Philadelphia were chosen as locations for the centers because gang activity was most entrenched 
in those poor and working-class, black neighborhoods.54 In its early stages, Safe Streets saw 35 
to 50 juveniles enter each center daily with youth workers attempting to develop one-on-one 
relationships with attendees. Among the activities offered to hundreds of teenaged visitors were 
academic tutoring, job training, neighborhood cleanup projects, sports, newspaper writing, and 
publishing. Since many youth who were “directed” to the centers were “troubled,” lived 
disadvantaged lives, and or faced inequality in schools, housing, and employment, Safe Streets 
provided group therapy sessions (facilitated by residents from the North Philadelphia drug 
treatment center, Gaudenzia House) and annual trips to the theater and the Poconos to 
rehabilitate and provide positive recreation for attendees. According to Specter, events like the 
four-day retreat to the Poconos for 100 boys during the Summer was a great opportunity to 
reduce gang violence and end turf wars between rival gangs.55 
      The same year Safe Streets was established, the Philadelphia Police Department received a 
LEAA grant of $19,733  for creating a closed-circuit television system linking the city’s police 
districts. Additionally, with Rizzo as police commissioner, violence between black males and 
white police officers began to spike with the use of police policies and procedures of stop and 
frisk, quotidian surveillance, illegal house raids, public strip searches, false criminal accusations 
                                               
53 “The Safe Streets project—Inroads on Phila. Gang Control?”  
54 The North Philadelphia location was a rowhome in a residential neighborhood, while the West Philadelphia 
location was a storefront connected to a row of businesses.   
55 “U.S. gives DA $80,000 for Gang Control.”  
18 
and arrests, and verbal and physical assaults on suspects, average law-abiding citizens, political 
activists, and protestors at peaceful demonstrations.56  Furthermore, Safe Streets, along with other 
local Great Society programs like Start Towards Eliminating Past Setbacks (STEPS) and 
Philadelphia’s Leaders of Tomorrow (PLOT) became a crucial response to crime where local 
politicians and community activists made multiple efforts to eradicate gang activity and police-
community tension.57 Even community and civil rights organizations like the North City 
Congress (NCC) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) attempted to curb gang activity 
and juvenile delinquency by arranging truce meetings between major North Philadelphia gangs, 
citizens, and police.58 Unfortunately, politicians like Mayor Tate doubted these social programs 
would lead to major crime reduction. In 1969, the Tate Administration attempted to persuade the 
federal government to allocate only $44,000 to Specter’s program and give the Philadelphia 
Police Department $56,000 for crime-fighting initiatives.59 Moreover, this was the beginning of a 
long-term battle between liberals and conservatives over how federal funding would be 
distributed and spent to combat juvenile delinquency, crime, and rioting. 
Specter vs. Rizzo: The Fight for LEAA Grant Funding 
      In 1970, the high-stakes efforts to reduce gang activity on a shoestring budget became public 
knowledge when Philadelphia Inquirer journalists William J. Speer and Tom Ferrick reported on 
their visits to Safe Streets’ North Philadelphia center in February and July respectively of that 
year. When Speer arrived at 2201 W. Stewart Street, he saw a three-story, six room storefront 
that looked like a “neglected 50-year-old building with a swift paint job.”60 He described Safe 
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Streets as an “experimental program” open six days a week from 9 AM to 9 PM where juveniles 
received help with “scholastic and job difficulties” and rival gangs could “rap out” their 
differences in intense group therapy instead of resorting to violence with “pipes, cleavers, knives, 
and guns.”61 For the girls who attended the center, there were “local women” who taught them 
homecrafts (e.g., sewing), but the organization primarily wanted the girlfriends of gang members 
as an exploitative measure in which their presence could “win the confidence” of the young men 
and help them get reformed.62 In Ferrick’s article, his description of the contents in the North 
Philadelphia center demonstrated the financial difficulties the organization had: chairs, a few 
“ancient desks,” a blackboard, a ping pong table, and a record player “that looks too old to 
play.”63 
     In Speer’s article, he depicted the centers’ economic struggles in providing educational 
resources for youth by describing how the staff at the West Philadelphia center (sharing a facility 
with the Christian Young Life organization) were tutoring youth with thirty and forty-year-old 
reading and math books as they patiently awaited the arrival of books donated by the Board of 
Education. The centers offered meager success in employment for gang members because the 
facilities did not provide adequate job training in vocational skills.64 Speer noted that while the 
Philadelphia Tutorial Project offered study help to juveniles, the State Bureau of Employment 
Security provided job counseling, despite its rare visits to the center. In fact, during the existence 
of Safe Streets a Philadelphia mechanic who read in the newspaper about the organization 
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volunteered to fund transportation to his shop so that he could teach youth from the centers his 
trade.65  
      In August 1971, Willard Scott, a 66-year-old proprietor of an auto repair business since 1929, 
heard about Safe Streets’ mission and called the DA’s Office requesting to train gang members 
to be mechanics.66 Scott, not fully aware of the social conditions drifting some black youth into 
gang activity was concerned about the senselessness of gang violence and how simple it could 
partially be solved:  
These black kids need jobs and a challenge. But they keep killing each other and tilling up the jails. I 
know my own 16-year-old—he’s so crazy about hot-rod engines, he can’t get into trouble..Send me some 
of those gang members. I’ve got a car business and I’ll teach them how to work on engines. If it works, 
maybe we can get some of ‘em jobs.67 
 
 According to Safe Streets’ Executive Director Heywood Matthews, Scott was the first 
businessman to volunteer a vocational training program for the cash-strapped organization. Scott 
soon welcomed eight youth to his garage at 1501 N. 61st Street and was immediately impressed 
by their work ethic: “I couldn’t believe how nice they were, how hard they’d work. I had ‘em 
tearing down engines eight hours a day, learning the basics. They wouldn’t go across the street 
for cigarettes without asking my permission.”68  
      Once Christmas 1971 arrived, six youth dropped the program because they could not afford 
the bus fare and lunch required to participate. Safe Streets tried to procure a $40 a week 
subsistence for the boys’ expenses, but the organization struggled to acquire the funds. Instead, 
Scott, Reverend Marshall Shepard’s congregation at Mt. Olivet Tabernacle Church, and 
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Reverend Joseph Whearty of Our Lady of Victory Church raised money to cover the costs.69 By 
February 1, 1972, Scott accepted a class of ten gang members with the goal of getting them jobs 
as mechanics after ten weeks of training at one of the 50 garages and service stations in his 
community. The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin journalist covering the story about Scott’s 
partnership with Safe Streets in March 1972 not only demonstrated how appealing and vital 
vocational training was for gang members, but also concluded his article with a sharp critique of 
the police state in America’s major cities: solving gang violence this way is a “bargain” in the 
“era of $100 million police budgets.”70 
      Speer’s report on Safe Streets also cast doubt on the organization’s long-term success when 
he suggested it had to successfully prove it could solve youth gang violence since it was “being 
watched” by civic and law enforcement agencies. Safe Streets was not only concerned about 
attendee retention at the centers, but also possible gang activity at night when the centers were 
closed.71 Additionally, the lack of parental, community, and gang member support for the 
organization troubled not only Speer, but also Unit Director Charles Fowler:  
If the problem doesn’t hit them [parents] in their own parlor, they just don’t get concerned about it...If you 
get the [gang] leader on your side, you got the whole gang with you...In many cases, the leader has more 
power over the gang members than the boys’ parents...We want the boys to look beyond their present 
situation. We want them to see that there is no future in being a gang member.72 
 Nevertheless, the staff at Safe Streets remained committed to their mission to reduce gang 
violence, as voiced by Project Administrator Walter W. Cohen: “Our central aim is to stop 
killing, but that is not our final aim—our final aim is to enable these kids to see the senselessness 
of killing and to participate in normal activities.”73 Nine days after Ferrick’s article was 
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published, the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin reported the LEAA allocated $150,000 for 
“Philadelphia’s emergency juvenile gang control project.” Once Specter learned about the 
allocation, he asked Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott to expedite the funds since the 
organization was in immediate need of them to continue operations.74 The City of Philadelphia 
also received an LEAA grant (a month prior) in the amount of $80,267. Despite the brewing 
competition Safe Streets had with the police department for funds, Specter reiterated the 
significance of his program in a press release by stating his grant would be used to “increase job 
opportunities, overcome functional illiteracy, and set up guidance group interaction techniques to 
instill a more mature social responsible attitude and behavior pattern in juveniles.”75 
      In August 1970, the relationship between the black community and the police took a 
nosedive when Police Commissioner Rizzo conflated black radicals with black criminals and 
ordered the raid of multiple offices of the Black Panther Party (BPP) following the shootings of 
four policemen in two days. On August 29, 1970, 39-year-old Park Policeman James Harrington 
was sitting in his police wagon a hundred yards from the Cobbs Creek Guardhouse in West 
Philadelphia when five black men from revolutionary group, the Black Unity Council, shot him 
at point-blank range.76 The men then entered the guardhouse and shot 43-year-old Fairmount 
Park Police Sergeant Frank Von Colln five times, murdering him as he sat at his desk.77 On the 
night of August 30, 1970, twenty-five-year-old Patrolman Thomas J. Gibbons Jr. (the son of 
former Police Commissioner Gibbons), and his partner, 28-year-old John J. Nolen were shot 
after they stopped two black men in a stolen car in Southwest Philadelphia. After two days of 
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anti-police violence from black men, Rizzo spoke to the media about both incidents. Following 
Rizzo’s visit to Gibbons and Nolen at Misericordia Hospital, he told news reporters “this is no 
longer a civilized neighborhood.”78 Rizzo then erroneously announced that the Panthers were 
responsible for Sergeant Von Colln’s murder instead of the Black Unity Council.  
      Rizzo was already unhappy with the Black Panthers because, since 1966, the BPP’s goal for 
black youth was to take a Marxist, black nationalist view and educate them on how institutional 
racism, poverty, and police brutality damaged the black community.79 The Panthers’ pamphlet, 
Ten-Point Program, outlined the goals the organization had for the community, which included 
demanding the government provide full employment, decent housing, and education for black 
people. In the BPP’s pamphlet, Eight Points of Attention, outlined moral principles for its 
members to follow as role models in the black community, such as “do not hit or swear at 
people,” “do not take liberties with women,” and “do not damage property of the oppressed 
masses.” Additionally, the Panthers provided numerous missions programs to alleviate some of 
the socioeconomic burdens lower-class blacks faced each day.80 These programs included a 
community ambulance service, free medical and legal clinics, a police patrol (where Panthers 
openly carried guns and followed police cars to preemptively prevent police brutality), 
community centers, and the Free Breakfast for School Children Program.81 Since the Panthers 
provided these free resources to impoverished blacks in the city, their political propaganda 
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appealed to the black community because it identified institutional racism and the failure of 
social welfare programs as causes for the struggles of the urban black poor.  
      In the early morning hours of August 31st, Rizzo assisted in 100 police marksmen raiding 
two BPP offices in North and Northwest Philadelphia and the organization’s main headquarters 
in West Philadelphia, even though a homicide detective already arrested the suspects involved in 
the shootings of Officer Harrington and Sergeant Von Colln.82 The officers soon publicly strip 
searched seven Panthers on a residential street, effectively humiliating them in front of onlookers 
and news media. The image of several bare-chested, barefoot, or completely nude Panthers lined 
up against a wall was captured by Daily News photographer, Elwood P. Smith, and later 
distributed around the world by United Press International. In press conferences, Rizzo 
responded to the incident unabashed: 
This was an excellent job. They can hide weapons, grenades and so forth, in their clothing…We did nothing 
wrong…Their feelings were hurt. The big Black Panthers with their trousers down…We had information from 
infiltrators and informers and from the black community that they did have guns in there…Some black leaders spew 
out. Why did they not speak out before? I didn’t hear them speak out when Von Colln was shot. As far as I’m 
concerned, they can go wash their necks.83 
Furthermore, this incident not only demonstrated how black activists and criminal suspects were 
negligently categorized as one threatening entity to police, but also how organizations promoting 
alternative methods to solving the societal problems of urban life would be discredited publicly 
by city officials who believed government spending on crime-fighting was more useful than 
social programs meant to uplift citizens.      
      When Rizzo became mayor on January 3, 1972, he immediately began a crackdown on gangs 
in the city. At the time, there were approximately 200 gangs in operation (with 96% of members 
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being black males) and citizens and politicians alike were concerned that gang violence was 
interfering with the everyday lives of Philadelphians.84 In communities deemed gang territory, 
merchants had to close their businesses early, parents had to transport their children to and from 
school, and residents often feared turf wars between rival gangs. There were even news reports 
of innocent bystanders getting caught in the middle of gang crossfire, like 42-year-old Pearl 
Cooper who was shot in the chest and arm as she travelled home from the grocery store.85 
Ultimately, the goal of the crackdown was to enforce Pennsylvania’s law on the prohibition of 
concealed deadly weapons while also invoking the city ordinance requiring citizens to register if 
they wanted to carry a weapon in a public place. 
       Beginning on January 30, 1972, the city ran a two-week moratorium on the prosecution of 
gang members who turned in their weapons at neighborhood firehouses with no questions asked. 
Although some gang members refused to turn in their weapons for fear they would be disarmed 
and vulnerable to rival gangs, the city recovered a total of 58 rifles and revolvers.86 Following 
the moratorium, the city proposed mass arrests of gang members to expeditiously eliminate gang 
activity. In reference to the police policy of “stop and frisk” for weapons, City Managing 
Director Hillel S. Levinson was quoted as confirming the procedure as necessary action: “The 
city is looking very seriously at gang activities. It is not going to accept them any longer.”87 
Rizzo himself was also quoted by the press for his “tough on crime” approach as mayor: 
We know who they are. They're going to be stopped on the street by the police and we're going to talk to 
them. They had better hope they don't have weapons on them. We are going to move against gangs and 
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we are not going to take any stuff from them. If they want to fight hand‐to‐hand, we'll take them on. 
That's the challenge.88 
      After the moratorium, the Confederation for the Conservation of Our City asked churches 
and synagogues to be open 24 hours a day on the weekend of February 12-13, 1972 as 
sanctuaries for gang members if mass arrests occurred. While the city proposed mass arrests, 
local organizations like the West Philadelphia organization, Umoja, Inc. arranged peace talks 
with about 500 gang members to avoid the crackdown.89 According to journalists, organizations 
like this were in agreement with sociologists and gang members that the solution to gang activity 
was adequate job training programs and jobs for unemployed, unskilled, high school dropouts.  
      From 1973 to 1974, gang violence decreased but the presence of gangs in Philadelphia was 
still prevalent. By 1974, there were approximately 250 youth gangs in Philadelphia alone, with 
membership for each gang ranging from 18 to 200 individuals between the ages of ten to twenty-
two years old. According to police, gang activity was strongly active within the black 
communities of North and West Philadelphia, leading city officials to concentrate more on 
curbing crime in those neighborhoods.90 At Safe Streets the organization was in danger of being 
shut down after it received a six-month evaluation and the Philadelphia Regional Planning 
Council decided to discontinue disbursement of funds on December 31, 1974. Progress reports 
were regularly sent to the Governor's Justice Commission where they were transferred to Keith 
Miles at the Office of Evaluation, LEAA-NILECJ within the Department of Justice.91  
      In July 1974, an evaluation team from the historically-black college, Lincoln University 
visited Safe Streets’ centers, conducted interviews with staff and juvenile attendees, reviewed the 
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program’s components, and requested records of operation to determine whether the organization 
was impactful in ending gang violence in the city.92 Once their evaluation was complete, the 
team determined that Safe Streets “tried to do too much for too many” and given its difficulties 
with efficient record-keeping, sufficient and highly-experienced staff, and proper coordination 
with the Youth Service Commission (YSC) that arranged training programs for juveniles, the 
non-profit should close its doors and allow the program to “go on where it can until the new plan 
is developed.”93 
      One of the main reasons for Safe Streets’ “failures” was financial support. The organization 
had poor record-keeping because data on juveniles and program affairs were often handwritten 
and these documents were only accessible to evaluators when staff had the time and means to 
produce typewritten copies.94 The staff who ran the centers were often former gang members 
who had neither a college education nor formal training in vocational skills or group therapy, 
therefore the organization had to hire or solicit volunteers who were trained in the fields 
necessary to meet the needs of juveniles. Additionally, staff at the centers were often paid low 
wages and pressured to work long hours so that juveniles could remain at the centers all day, 
instead of spending time on the streets where gang activity occurred.95 Lastly, poor record-
keeping and low morale among overworked staff members made program partnerships with the 
YSC an extra burden.96 Although evaluators from Lincoln University believed the sports and 
recreation programs for youth were sound, they “lacked coordination and were weak in social 
service referral and follow up.”97 Nevertheless, while Safe Streets ideally wanted to end gang 
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violence with the resources it provided, the organization did not have enough manpower or 
finances to achieve its goals. 
      In November 1974, the Philadelphia Regional Planning Council disapproved Safe Streets’ 
funding application because they received poor evaluations from Lincoln University and 
therefore saw no comprehensive planning to reduce gang activity from the organization’s current 
efforts. Director of the Philadelphia Regional Council, Yvonne Haskins, later stated in a press 
release the disapproval was because “funding for ineffective programs was wrong” and before 
additional federal funds are spent, the city’s Youth Services Commission  must “devise an 
overall plan aimed at curbing gang violence.”98 Even though Safe Streets was scheduled to close 
that December, officials attempted to win more funding for the program by petitioning multiple 
politicians.99  
      On January 6, 1975, the Governor’s Justice Commission met in Harrisburg to consider 
funding Safe Streets and two other low-performing social programs, the Intensive Area Youth 
Workers and Youth Development, operated by the Philadelphia Public Welfare Department. At 
the conclusion of the meeting, Safe Streets, having already received $942,165 in LEAA funds 
over the years, was granted two more months to operate with $30,000 in federal subsidies. Initial 
responses to the news of unexpected funding was mixed. Executive Director of Safe Streets, 
Lewis Taylor Jr. responded with elation stating that the added funds would safeguard the 
organization’s basketball, job counselling, vocational training, and educational programs for 400 
youth because 27 staff workers would be retained. City Managing Director, Hillel Levinson 
responded with a cautious sense of relief in that the three programs were crucial to curbing gang 
activity on the community level because they were the only municipal entities outside of the 
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police department that directly tackled gang issues: “to discontinue them would severely restrict 
our ability to handle gangs other then by police action.”100 Unfortunately, the Intensive Area 
Youth Workers and Youth Development were denied additional funding, a fate Safe Streets 
hoped to avoid after its two-month extension ended. 
      Less than six months after Safe Streets won additional funding from the Governor’s Justice 
Commission, the organization was in jeopardy again when the city’s budget for social programs 
and the police department was under consideration by the Philadelphia Regional Planning 
Council. On the evening of June 19, 1975, the council met at Midtown Holiday Inn to review 
Safe Streets’ application for $217,496 in federal funds.101 The council criticized the organization 
for continuously relying on LEAA grants and not searching for other financial supporters. The 
council then denied Safe Streets’ application with an 8-7 vote, leaving the final decision on 
funding to the Governor’s Justice Commission.102  
      At the same meeting, the council reviewed the city’s application for $1.04 million to install a 
computerized police radio dispatching system for the police department. As early as August 
1974, the city noticed a 16% increase in police calls and argued that this rise in police requests 
left the department “overtaxed” and unable to respond quickly.”103 Believing rising crime rates 
required advanced policing techniques to remedy the issue, city officials hired an independent 
consultant who recommended the police department use a computer system to keep logs of  911 
calls, the precise locations of callers, and the availability of police cars to arrive at crime scenes 
or emergency situations. State criminal justice planner, Ted Shoemaker praised the approach, 
stating that if Philadelphia carried out this plan it would be the “first in the country” to do so, 
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especially since the city preferred a private consultant to set up the system rather than rely on 
computer firms to simply supply the necessary equipment.104 Ultimately, the council approved 
the city’s request to spend additional funds on policing. 
  Since June 1975, Safe Streets was constantly granted additional funding by the Governor’s 
Justice Commission to stay open “temporarily,” but the organization always existed with the 
threat of closure as it survived on an insufficient budget. Although city officials knew Safe 
Streets was a financial failure, they believed the organization had a quasi-effective approach to 
remedying gang activity, rising crime rates, and juvenile delinquency. In late August 1976, the 
Board of Managers of the Philadelphia Youth Study Center wanted to send “troubled and cast-
off children” between the ages of nine and seventeen to temporary foster and group homes while 
they awaited their hearings in Juvenile Court for minor criminal offenses.105 City officials, 
believing that jail was an inappropriate institution for low-risk youth to await trial, considered 
Safe Streets a potential facility to lodge at least six juveniles at each center overnight since its 
mission was to rehabilitate and steer children from violence and crime.106 By December 1976, 
the organization was finally forced to shutter its doors when its grants from the city and federal 
governments were discontinued.  
      From 1970 to 1976, Philadelphia gradually spent more money funding the police, prisons and 
the courts than it did on juvenile commitment and the Youth Study Center.107 In 1976, 
approximately 89% of Philadelphia’s $236 million budget for fighting crime went to the police 
department, prisons, and the courts. Programs committed to rehabilitating juvenile delinquents 
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received only 3.7% of budgetary spending.108 In the late 1970s, Philadelphia’s economic issues 
gave government officials like Mayor Rizzo more leeway to argue that unpoliced (black) crime 
contributed to the city’s financial difficulties. Few factories remained in Philadelphia as many 
companies moved their headquarters and production factories to the suburbs to reduce business 
expenses and increase profit margins. As factories left cities, so did jobs. In the summer of 1977, 
Philadelphia and South Jersey saw the disappearance of more than 11,900 jobs in construction, 
factories, services, and government, resulting in the region’s unemployment rate teeter tottering 
between 7.1 and 8.8%.109 Although 1,339,400 people were employed, and 447,300 new jobs 
were created in August 1977, the increase in residents quitting the job search made citizens and 
politicians alike cynical about the city’s economic future. From 1972-1977, Philadelphia 
experienced depopulation when nearly 250,000 people moved out of the city.110 With 
Philadelphia losing not only business, property, and sales taxes from job flight and white flight, 
the city’s tax base was struggling to finance the public services of water, sewage, street paving, 
street cleaning (including snow removal), street lighting, police, and fire services.111 Moreover, 
conservative city officials like Rizzo thought it was more viable to curb crime with massive 
funding for the police, prisons, and courts to quickly undo the job flight and depopulation issues 
that plagued the Philadelphia.   
Conclusion: The Legacy: North Philly Peace Park 
      If you go to 2201 W. Stewart Street, the former location of the North Philadelphia center of 
Safe Streets, you will find a vacant lot. Interestingly, in that vacant area is the North Philly Peace 
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Park, an organization established in 2012 by community activist Tommy Joshua. As in the era of 
Safe Streets, the North Philly Peace Park is a safe space in the middle of gang territory. Children 
and adults can enter the large patch of land knowing that in Sharswood weapons, drugs, trash, 
and violence are prohibited. At the park, there is a community garden, wooden park benches, and 
brightly-painted car tires as decoration and recreation for children. The volunteers who work 
there tend to the garden, distribute free food to community residents in need, and sell trinkets and 
apparel to raise money for community projects like a vocational school for neighborhood 
children. Although, gang activity there has not dissipated and Safe Streets has been defunct for 
over forty years, the mission of the organization still lives on in the North Philly Peace Park as 
community residents and activists work to fulfill the goals that Specter and his board once 
proposed. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Philadelphia’s Population by Race, 1900-1980 
Demographics Table of white and black populations in Philadelphia. 
Census 
Year 
Total Population White Population (Number 
and Percent) 
African American/Black 
Population (Number 
and Percent) 
1900 1,293,697 1,229,673 (95.1%) 62,613 (4.8%) 
1910 1,549,008 1,463,371 (94.5%) 84,459 (5.5%) 
1920 1,823,779 1,688,180 (92.6%) 134,229 (7.4%) 
1930 1,950,961 1,728,806 (88.6%) 219,599 (11.3%) 
1940 1,931,334 1,678,577 (86.9%) 250,880 (13.0%) 
1950 2,071,605 1,692,637 (81.7%) 376,041 (18.2%) 
1960 2,002,512 1,467,479 (73.3%) 529,240 (26.4%) 
1970 1,948,609 1,278,717 (65.6%) 653,791 (33.6%) 
1980 1,688,210 983,084 (58.2%) 638,878 (37.8%) 
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Figure 2: Chart of Active, Sporadic, and Dormant Gangs in Philadelphia as of May 13, 
1968 (Printed in Phineas M. Anderson’s The Gang Unit) 
 (Source: Gang Control Unit, Philadelphia Police Department) 
Gang Area Foes Members Status 
2-4 Counts 25th to 27th; 
Passyunk-Snyder 
Hill; P.J.'s 25  Sporadic 
P.J.'s 25th to 27th; 
Passyunk-Snyder 
(Claims same 
territory as 2-4 
Counts) 
2-4 Counts; 
22nd & 
Greenwich 
30 Active 
5th Street 3rd to 7th Street; 
Federal to South 
 
13th Street 45 Active 
13th Street 9th to Broad Street; 
Christian-South 
All gangs in 
South Phila. 
60 Active 
5th and Porter 4th to 6th Street; 
Moore to Porter  
7th Street 25 Sporadic 
7th Street Mifflin to Wolf; 5th 
to 8th Street  
5th and Porter 30 Active 
15th and Clymer 
Street 
Broad to 17th; 
Washington-South 
13th Street 30 Active 
19th and 
Dorrance Street 
19th to 20th Street; 
Reed to Dickinson 
Street 
None at this 
time 
40 Sporadic 
21st and Titan 
Street 
19th to 22nd Street; 
Reed-Washington 
Avenue 
13th Street 20 Active 
22nd and 
Greenwich Street 
22nd to 24th Street; 
Wharton-Watkins 
Street 
Roads; P.J.’s 25 Active 
22nd and South 
Street 
17th to 23rd Street; 
Washington-South 
13th Street 45 Active 
20th and 
Carpenter Street 
22nd to 25th Street; 
Washington-
None at this 
time 
20 Sporadic 
35 
Carpenter Street 
2-T-6 26th to 30th Street; 
Wharton to Moore 
Taylor Street; 
P.J.'s 
25 Sporadic 
30th and Tasker 
Street 
26th to 33rd Street; 
Morris to Reed 
Street 
Any gang 
from outside 
their area 
30 Sporadic 
Roads 25th to 30th Street; 
Wharton to Grays 
Ferry Avenue 
13th Street; 
Taylor Street  
25 Active 
Taylor Street 23rd to 25th Street; 
Tasker to Federal 
Street 
Roads; 2-T-6 25 Sporadic 
Wine 20th to 21st Street; 
Christian to 
Washington 
Avenue 
22nd and 
South Street 
20 Sporadic 
20th Street 20th to 22nd Street; 
Gerritt to Watkins 
Have several 
corners but 
will band 
together 
70 Active 
10th and 
Carpenter Street 
10th to 9th Street; 
Washington to 
Christian Street 
Any gang in 
South Phila. 
10 Sporadic 
12th and Poplar 8th to 12th Street; 
Green to Girard 
Avenue  
Moroccans; 
12th and 
Oxford  
50 Active 
T.G.O.’s Broad to 13th 
Street; Fairmount 
to Parrish 
12th and 
Poplar 
20 Sporadic 
16th and 
Wallace Street 
Broad to 20th 
Street; Fairmount 
to Spring Garden 
Street 
Moroccans 20 Active 
Moroccans Broad to 20th 
Street; Fairmount 
to Girard Avenue 
12th and 
Poplar; 16th 
and Seybert 
75 Active 
36 
16th and 
Dauphin 
Broad to 18th 
Street; Lehigh to 
Susquehanna 
Avenue 
21st and 
Norris 
30 Active 
21st and Norris 19th to 22nd Street; 
Susquehanna to 
Berks Street 
16th and 
Dauphin; 
Valley 
40 Active 
28th and 
Montgomery 
24th to 27th Street; 
Columbia to 
Montgomery 
Valley; 
DeMarco’s; 
28th and 
Oxford; 30th 
and Norris  
50 Active 
2-9-D’s 28th to 32nd Street; 
Norris to York 
30th and 
Norris 
30 Active 
30th and Norris 30th to 33rd Street; 
Susquehanna to 
Montgomery 
Valley; 32nd 
and Turner; 
28th and 
Montgomery   
30 Active 
32nd and Turner 31st to 33rd Street; 
Columbia to 
Oxford 
30th and 
Norris 
25 Active 
L.T.’s 29th to 33rd Street; 
Huntingdon to 
Lehigh 
Village 45 Dormant 
Village 24th to 27th; 
Dauphin to 
Cumberland 
L.T.’s  60 Sporadic 
Valley Broad to 26th 
Street; Columbia to 
Diamond Street 
15th and 
Oxford; 30th 
and Norris 
250 Active 
15th and Oxford Broad to 18th 
Street; Columbia to 
Jefferson Street 
16th and 
Montgomery; 
21st and 
Montgomery; 
19th and 
Montgomery 
20 Active 
DeMarco’s 20th to 25th Street; 
Thompson to 
21st and 
Montgomery; 
45 Active 
37 
Columbia Avenue  28th and 
Oxford 
19th and Harlan 18th to 20th Street; 
Jefferson to 
Columbia Avenue 
Valley; 21st 
and 
Montgomery  
30 Active 
16th and Seybert Broad to 18th 
Street; Girard to 
Jefferson Street  
Moroccans; 
12th and 
Poplar 
40 Active 
2-4-R'S 24th to 25th Street; 
Oxford to Jefferson 
28th and 
Oxford 
25 Sporadic 
28th and Oxford 22nd to 32nd 
Street; Girard to 
Oxford Street  
DeMarco’s; 
24th and 
Redner 
20 Active 
M.M.F. 8th to Broad Street; 
Lehigh to 
Clearfield  
Zulu Nation 30 Active 
Camac and 
Butler 
10th to Broad 
Street; Erie to 
Hunting Park  
None at this 
time 
20 Sporadic 
Uptown Norris 6th to 10th Street; 
Somerset to 
Allegheny 
None at this 
time 
50 Sporadic 
8th and Diamond 6th to Broad Street; 
Berks to York 
Street 
8th and 
Oxford; Zulu 
Nation 
100 Active 
8th and Oxford 5th to Broad Street; 
Jefferson to Berks 
8th and 
Diamond; 
12th and 
Poplar 
60 Active 
Zulu Nation Front to 7th Street; 
Columbia to 
Lehigh  
M.M.F.; 8th 
and Diamond 
200 Active 
Stars 2nd to 5th Street; 
Diamond to 
Huntingdon  
None at this 
time 
50 Dormant 
Soul Diplomats 2nd to 5th Street; None at this 25 Sporadic 
38 
Diamond to 
Huntingdon  
time 
Sommerville Chew Avenue to 
21st Street; Chelten 
to Ogontz Avenue 
Dogtown; 
Haines Street  
200 Active 
Dogtown Gorgas Lane to 
Walnut Lane; 
Chew to 
Germantown 
Avenue 
Sommerville; 
Haines Street  
75 Active 
Pulaski Town Queen Lane to 
Chelten Avenue; 
Pulaski to 
Wissahickon 
Avenue 
Sommerville; 
Haines Street 
30 Dormant 
Haines Street Germantown 
Avenue to Belfield 
Ave.; Walnut Lane 
to Chelten Avenue 
Dogtown; 
Sommerville; 
Brickyard 
60 Active 
Brickyard Penn to Logan 
Street; 
Germantown 
Avenue to Rubicam 
Street 
Haines Street 40 Sporadic 
Clang 68th Avenue to 
65th Avenue; 
Ogontz to Broad 
Street  
Sommerville 75 Active 
15th and 
Venango 
Broad to 17th 
Street; Erie to 
Tioga Street 
M.M.F.; 21st 
and 
Westmoreland 
35 Active 
23rd and 
Atlantic 
Hunting Park 
Avenue to Ontario; 
21st to 23rd Street 
 21st and 
Westmoreland 
30 Active 
 21st and 
Westmoreland 
Broad to 22nd 
Street; Lehigh 
Avenue to 
Westmoreland 
23rd and 
Atlantic; 15th 
and Venango  
50 Active 
39 
39th and Aspen 39th to Union 
Street; Aspen to 
Brown 
36th and 
Market; 
Empires; 41st 
and Brown; 
43rd and 
Pennsgrove  
35 Active 
Theta Phi 
Omicrons 
33rd to 34th Street; 
Haverford to 
Mantua Avenue  
36th and 
Market 
20 Active 
36th and Market 
(This gang 
moved but still 
carries the old 
corner's name) 
51st and Sansom 39th and 
Aspen 34th 
and Haverford 
40 Active 
Empires 35th to 36th Street; 
Haverford to 
Wallace 
39th and 
Aspen 
20 Active 
41st and Brown 41st Street - 
Fairmount-Brown 
39th and 
Aspen 
20 Active 
43rd and 
Pennsgrove 
40th to 43rd; 
Westminster to 
Mantua Avenue 
39th and 
Aspen; June 
and Parrish 
15 Active 
Coast 57th to 60th Street; 
Spruce to Market 
Street 
Moons; Cedar 
Avenue 
30 Active 
Cedar Avenue 55th to 57th Street; 
Baltimore to Cedar 
Coast; Creeks; 
49th and 
Woodland 
25 Active 
49th and 
Woodland 
48th to 50th Street; 
Upland to Chester 
Avenue  
Cedar Avenue 30 Sporadic 
60th and 
Webster 
59th to 60th Street; 
Christian to Pine 
Creeks; 49th 
and Woodland  
20 Active 
Moons 58th to 63rd Street; 
Market to Jefferson 
Coast 50 Active 
June and Parrish June to 48th Street; 
Parrish to Brown 
43rd and 
Pennsgrove 
20 Dormant 
40 
Lansdowners 54th to 58th Street; 
Lancaster to 
Lansdowne 
Moons 20 Sporadic 
Creeks  61st to 63rd Street; 
Cobbs Creek 
Parkway to 
Christian 
Cedar 
Avenue; Coast 
20 Dormant 
 
Figure 3: Chart of Additional Gangs in Philadelphia as of April 1970 (Printed in Phineas 
M. Anderson’s The Gang Unit) 
 (Source: Youth Conservation Services, Philadelphia Welfare Department) 
Gang Area Foes Members Status 
31st and Reed -- Unknown Unknown Unknown 
20th and 
Dickinson 
Streets 
-- Unknown Unknown Unknown 
2-S-6 26th and South 
Streets 
Unknown Unknown Unknown 
2-E-6 26th and Earp 
Streets 
Unknown Unknown Unknown 
2-M-1 21st and Morris 
Streets 
Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Hill Gang  31st and Mifflin 
Streets 
Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Toppers  -- Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Main Streeters  -- Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Black Bridge -- Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Centaurs  -- Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Counties -- Unknown Unknown Unknown 
CC Counts -- Unknown Unknown Unknown 
31st and 
Montgomery 
-- Unknown Unknown Unknown 
41 
Avenue 
28th and Oxford 
Streets 
-- Unknown Unknown Unknown 
31st and 
Cumberland 
Streets 
-- Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Cambria 
Streeters  
20th and 
Cambria Streets 
Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Cool World 
Valley  
-- Unknown Unknown Unknown 
58-W's  58th and 
Willows 
Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Wallace 
Streeters 
12th and Wallace 
Streets 
Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Twine Debs of 
Soul  
Chelten and 
Ardleigh Streets 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Da Nang Delta Chelten and 
Ardleigh Streets 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Black Volunteer 
Society  
13th and 
Fitzwater Streets 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Last Siders  Roxborough Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
32nd and 
Haverford 
Avenue 
-- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
58th and Whitby 
Avenue 
-- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
58th and Chester 
Avenue 
-- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Mill Creek Area -- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
42nd and Mantua 
Avenue (Girls) 
-- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
42 
23rd and 
Diamond Streets 
-- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
25th and 
Diamond Streets 
-- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Upsetters - 24th 
and Master 
(Girls) 
-- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Fishtown-
Lutheran Center 
Minis (Girls) 
-- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Fishtown-
Lutheran Center 
Minis (Boys) 
-- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Venice Islanders  Northwest 
Philadelphia 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Mayfair Area 
(Boys) 
Northwest 
Philadelphia 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Mayfair Area 
(Girls) 
Northwest 
Philadelphia 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
3-T-0  South 
Philadelphia 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
7th and Morris 
Streets 
-- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
2nd and Harps 
Streets 
-- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Hawthorne Area 
(Girls) 
-- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Wilson Park 
(Girls) 
-- Unknown 
 
Unknown 
 
Unknown 
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Figure 4: Philadelphia Spending to Fight Crime  
(Source: Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, “Billions for Safe Streets Yield Failure, Fear, Fury,” 
September 11, 1977.) 
Purpose Fiscal 1970 Fiscal 1976 
Police $80 million $152.5 million 
Prisons 8.6 million 18.1 million 
Defender Association 1.2 million 3.2 million 
Sheriff 1.9 million 3.6 million 
District Attorney 2.2 million 6.0 million 
Clerk of Courts 1.4 million 2.5 million 
Courts 15.5 million 39.8 million 
Youth Study Center 1.6 million 3.0 million 
Juvenile Commitment 3.0 million 5.7 million 
Citizens Crime Prevention -- 1.6 million 
Total $115.4 million 236 million 
 
Figure 5: Pennsylvania Spending to Fight Crime  
(Source: Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, “Millions for Safe Streets, and Crime Still Climbs,” 
March 10, 1974.) 
Year Law 
Enforcement 
Corrections Courts Total 
1969 $968,000 $349,000 $85,000 $1,427,000 
44 
1970 $4,598,000 $2,778,000 $1,383,000 $10,590,000 
1971 $6,757,000 $9,176,000 $2,286,000 $22,276,000 
1972 $6,908,000 $12,112,000 $2,811,000 $26,469,000 
1973 $9,512,000 $13,052,000 $3,724,000 $30,715,000 
 
Figure 6: Gang Related Homicides in Philadelphia, 1965-1976  
(Source: Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, May 23, 1976.) 
Year Number of Homicides 
1962 1 
1965 13 
1966 14 
1967 12 
1968 30 
1969 45 
1970 30 
1971 43 
1972 39 
1973 43 
1974 32 
45 
1975 15 
1976 3 
 
 
